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645 
ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION IS A 
FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY—BUT 
THE COURTS DON’T GET IT* 
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR.** 
The availability of government information is one of the foundations of 
American democracy. However, the courts have unfortunately failed to 
recognize this part of America’s creed. Moreover, the courts have 
consistently failed to recognize the danger of the overuse of government 
secrecy. 
Before delving into these two subjects, it might be helpful to describe 
how I first became aware of the overuse of government secrecy and of the 
harm this does to America. In 1975—at the age of thirty-nine and not 
knowing a single Senator—I was lucky to be appointed as the Chief 
Counsel of a Senate committee, popularly known as the Church Committee 
for its Chair, Senator Frank Church of Idaho.1 Before the Committee’s 
work in 1975-76, there had never been such a broad investigation—and 
disclosure—of secret governmental intelligence information in America or 
anywhere else.2 There has not been one since.3 
What did we learn and disclose? Six Presidents, Democrats and 
Republicans, from Franklin Roosevelt through Richard Nixon, had abused 
                                                                                                                 
 * This article consists of the revised text of a lecture made as part of the 2012 Henry 
Lecture Series at the University of Oklahoma College of Law on April 6, 2012. 
 ** Frederick A. O. (“Fritz”) Schwarz, Jr. is Chief Counsel for the Brennan Center for 
Justice at New York University School of Law. His government service includes being Chief 
Counsel of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee) (1975-76), Corporation Counsel of the City 
of New York during the Ed Koch Administration (1982-86), and Chair of the New York 
City Charter Revision Commission (1989). For many years, he was also a litigation partner 
of Cravath, Swaine & Moore. Among the many charitable boards he has chaired is the board 
of trustees of the Vera Institute of Justice, where he first met the Honorable Robert Henry.  
His book on government secrecy will be published by The New Press in Spring 2014. 
 1. The formal name of the Committee was the United States Senate Select Committee 
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Operations (hereafter 
referred to as Select Comm.). 
 2. See Christopher Hayes, The Secret Government, NATION (Aug. 26, 2009), http:// 
www.thenation.com/article/secret-government. 
 3. Id. 
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the powers of their secret intelligence agencies and had hid behind secrecy 
in doing so.4 
As for the agencies themselves, just a few examples. Millions of law-
abiding Americans were spied upon.5 The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
attempted to drive Martin Luther King to suicide, infiltrated many law-
abiding organizations including the NAACP and those associated with the 
Women’s Liberation Movement, sought to break up marriages of civil 
rights workers, and incited beatings and even killings.6 The Central 
Intelligence Agency hired the Mafia to attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro, 
overthrew democratically elected governments, experimented with 
dangerous drugs on unwitting Americans, and violated its charter by spying 
on dissident Americans at home.7 Both agencies opened mail illegally.8 
Both engaged in warrantless wiretapping and use of listening bugs.9 For 
decades, the National Security Agency received copies of millions of 
telegrams leaving America.10 
Why did the Church Committee succeed? Most importantly, by 
discovering and revealing that the government had acted secretly and 
illegally, as well as inconsistently with American values. But fundamental 
to those disclosures was that the Committee was remarkably non-partisan. 
In 1975-76, the partisan climate in America was far, far different than 
now.11 Keeping partisanship at bay was also surely helped by the fact that 
the Committee criticized secret acts of administrations of six Presidents 
from both political parties. Beyond these big-picture points, there are some 
details relating to access to and handling of information that help explain 
the Church Committee’s success. 
Focus. One of my early roles was to push to center the Committee’s 
work on previously secret information relating to “the extent, if any, [of] 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK II: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE 
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 9-10 (1976) [hereinafter SELECT COMM., 
BOOK II]. 
 5. See id. at 6. 
 6. See id. at 7, 10-11, 13, 15. 
 7. CTR. FOR NAT’L SEC. STUDIES, THE ABUSES OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 108-09, 
121, 130-31 (Jerry J. Berman & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1975); Hayes, supra note 2. 
 8. SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK III: SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF 
REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, 
at 561 (1976) [hereinafter SELECT COMM., BOOK III]; see also SELECT COMM., BOOK II, 
supra note 4, at 6, 12. 
 9. CTR. FOR NAT’L SEC. STUDIES, supra note 7, at 160-61. 
 10. SELECT COMM., BOOK II, supra note 4, at 6. 
 11. See DAVID BOREN, A LETTER TO AMERICA 43-54 (2008). 
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illegal, improper, or unethical activities.”12 Some thought we should instead 
emphasize “wise men” opining on what was wrong with the intelligence 
agencies and what reforms were needed. My instinct was that unless we 
showed shocking secret abuses to the American people, there would be no 
impetus toward reform. 
Senator Church sided with an aggressive investigation. 
Even after the Ford Administration began to cooperate with the Church 
Committee, I believed we still had to press for information—for details and 
documents. This is how we started our hearings when CIA Director 
William Colby appeared to testify about CIA assassination attempts. That 
day I pushed Director Colby to produce specific categories of documents 
relating to the assassination attempts, believing that testimony without 
documents risked being shallow. 
Care and Responsibility. Of course, there are legitimate secrets as well as 
illegitimate secrets. I believe one reason the White House agreed to provide 
us with sensitive information was that we recognized the need to protect 
legitimate secrets. 
The Committee’s reports and hearings were enormously detailed, 
revealing gobs of secret information.13 No improprieties were withheld. But 
sensible limits were placed on the details disclosed. For example, the actual 
names of lower-level undercover agents who had been tasked to do 
unseemly or illegal acts were not used; their bosses’ names, however, were 
included. 
                                                                                                                 
 12. S. Res. 21, 94th Cong., 121 CONG. REC. 839 (1975) (enacted). 
 13. See Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearings Before the Select Comm., Vol. 6, 
94th Cong. (1975); Covert Action: Hearings Before the Select Comm., Vol. 7, 94th Cong. 
(1975); The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights: Hearings Before the 
Select Comm., Vol. 5, 94th Cong. (1975); Mail Opening: Hearings Before the Select Comm., 
Vol. 4, 94th Cong. (1975); Internal Revenue Service: Hearings Before the Select Comm., 
Vol. 3, 94th Cong. (1975); Huston Plan: Hearings Before the Select Comm., Vol. 2, 94th 
Cong. (1975); Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents: Hearings Before the Select Comm., 
Vol. 1, 94th Cong. (1975); SELECT COMM., BOOK III, supra note 8; SELECT COMM., BOOK II, 
supra note 4; SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT, BOOK I: FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 
S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976); SELECT COMM., INTERIM REPORT, ALLEGED ASSASSINATION 
PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, S. REP. NO. 94-465 (1975) [hereinafter SELECT COMM., 
INTERIM REPORT]; see also LEROY ASHBY & ROD GRAMER, FIGHTING THE ODDS: THE LIFE OF 
SENATOR FRANK CHURCH (1994); LOCH K. JOHNSON, A SEASON OF INQUIRY: THE SENATE 
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION (1985); FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, 
UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR (2007); FRANK 
J. SMIST, JR., CONGRESS OVERSEES THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, 1947-
1994 (2d ed. 1994). 
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Another part of being responsible with secrets is avoiding leaks. We did 
that—with two exceptions, neither of which remotely affected “national 
security.”14 
Fairness and Understanding. My job was to help obtain secret 
information—clear information about wrongdoing, and the consequent 
harm to the nation—and then to put the information before the Senators and 
the public. But, at the same time, fairness required empathy for the men and 
women working in intelligence. During the Cold War, facing a ruthless 
enemy, Presidents and other high-level officials gave these men and women 
assignments that were in many ways impossible to fulfill. They were 
expected to predict or prevent every possible crisis, respond immediately 
with information on any question, and anticipate and respond to the 
incessant demands of Presidents. Under that pressure, it is no wonder that 
some cut corners. 
Nonetheless, it seemed to me that while empathy was appropriate, 
distance was also required. Many oversight bodies stumble by becoming 
too close to the agencies they oversee. Both empathy for, and distance 
from, the agencies and their people are needed. 
To sum up, the big lessons I learned during the Church Committee about 
openness and secrecy were: First, far too much is kept secret not to protect 
Americans, but to keep embarrassing and improper information from 
Americans. Second, secrecy, plus lack of oversight, inevitably leads to 
abuse. 
I. American Democracy Grew From the Seed of Openness 
Jefferson, Madison, and Lincoln all saw openness as necessary for a 
functioning democracy. And, looking for new traditions of openness to 
escape from British aristocratic hierarchy, our fledgling democracy had a 
second revolution—an information revolution—that helped the new nation 
progress and grow. 
A. Jefferson, Madison and Lincoln 
Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, Madison’s 51st Federalist 
Paper, and Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address each foresaw an America that 
depended upon the informed consent of its people. 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 99, 123-25. This article’s author’s recollection is 
that one leak was likely from a Senator; the other leak was from a staffer who leaked 
information that a Senator not on the Committee had previously been given about the CIA. 
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The Declaration planted the seed of openness. Although its long litany of 
complaints against King George III did not mention secrecy, support for 
openness is implicit in one of the most eloquent parts of the Declaration’s 
creed:  Governments “deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the 
governed.”15 Beneath this simple statement lays the truth that, unless the 
governed are informed about their government and their leaders, their 
consent cannot be meaningful. 
Thomas Jefferson, the Declaration’s principal author, later made explicit 
the implications of his earlier eloquence. “The basis of our governments 
being the opinion of the people,” he explained, the people must have “full 
information.”16 
In The Federalist Number 51, Madison, supporting ratification of the 
Constitution, pointed out that “[a] dependence on the people is, no doubt, 
the primary control on the government.”17 Where, however, secrecy 
conceals acts of our government and obscures the character of our leaders, 
the “people’s” use of the vote as their “primary control” on government is 
uninformed. We risk becoming a democracy in the dark. 
In his Gettysburg Address, Abraham Lincoln called for “a new birth of 
freedom,” so “that government of the people, by the people, [and] for the 
people, shall not perish from the earth.”18 But if government is truly to be 
“by” the people, necessary information cannot be hidden from the people. 
B. What About the Original Constitution? 
Of course, given the new nation’s radical changes from Great Britain, 
there were growing pains. One was when the Constitutional Convention 
met in Philadelphia during the spring and summer of 1787. There, the 
delegates passed a “Secrecy Rule,” binding them not to release even a 
whisper of their deliberations.19 Although the Constitution and its authors 
generally hold a sacred place in America, the tale of the 1787 Constitutional 
Convention does not make a broad case for limiting information to the 
public. For one thing, many of the harmful handmaidens of secret decision-
making were absent. 
                                                                                                                 
 15. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 16. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), in 11 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 48, 49 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955). 
 17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 18. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Nov. 19, 1863), in 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865, at 536, 536 (Don E. Fehrenbacher 
ed., 1989). 
 19. See CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 134-35 (1928). 
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• The participants in the Convention were not a narrow coterie of like- 
minded thinkers—they had different interests, and there were 
energetic debates and shifting coalitions.20 
 
• The decisions of the Convention were publicly released as soon as the 
document was finished. Indeed, the Constitution was already set in 
type the day the Convention adjourned; it was printed in newspapers 
in all thirteen states as rapidly as possible in the late eighteenth 
century.21 
 
• And, most importantly, before the proposed new Constitution could 
go into effect, it was publicly and vigorously debated in ratification 
campaigns and conventions in the states.22 
 
Indeed, as Madison put it, the Constitution itself was “of no more 
consequence than the paper on which it [was] written, unless it [was] 
stamped with the approbation of those to whom it [was] addressed.”23 
Subsequent constitutional amendments have been formulated and 
extensively debated in public. These include the Bill of Rights, which in 
1789 was publicly debated in the House, although passed by the Senate 
behind closed doors.24 Some eighty years later, the Civil War Amendments 
were all debated in public.25 So was the Nineteenth Amendment, granting 
women the right to vote.26 That these, and other, momentous changes were 
developed in the open undermines any assumption that public scrutiny of 
such deliberations stymies progress or inhibits candor. 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See DAVID O. STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787: THE MEN WHO INVENTED THE 
CONSTITUTION 27-47 (2007) (describing individual participants in the convention). 
 21. See JÜRGEN HEIDEKING, THE CONSTITUTION BEFORE THE JUDGMENT SEAT: THE 
PREHISTORY AND RATIFICATION OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 1787-1791, at 83, 454 
n.130 (John. P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va. 
trans., Univ. of Va. Press 2012) (1988). 
 22. See id. 
 23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, supra note 17, at 252 (James Madison).  
 24. ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, at 206-12 
(Bicentennial ed. 1991). 
 25. See GEORGE THOMAS, THE MADISONIAN CONSTITUTION 40 (2008). 
 26. Landmark Legislation: The Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution, U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/NineteenthAmendment.htm (last 
visited June 11, 2013). 
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In any event, the secrecy surrounding the Constitutional Convention at 
most supports the argument that there are some circumstances where 
meetings considering public policy issues ought not be held in the open. 
This can be correct—though not as uniformly as some secrecy advocates 
have contended. 
As for the Constitution itself, the first three words of its Preamble—“We 
the People”—make the People (not the States) the ultimate sovereign which 
will “ordain and establish” the Constitution.27 To be truly sovereign, the 
People require information.28 
C. A Second Revolution: More Democracy, More Education, More 
Information, and More Openness 
As powerfully put by one of the Founders, Dr. Benjamin Rush, while the 
Revolution had “changed our forms of government,” doing so had been 
only “the first act of the great drama.”29 The new nation still needed “a 
revolution in our principles, opinions, and manners so as to accommodate 
them to the forms of government we have adopted.”30 
As the new nation developed, there was, in fact, such a second 
revolution. It was, most of all, an information revolution. Timeless 
traditions were turned upside down. Throughout history, governments had 
gathered information about their subjects but kept secret most information 
about themselves. In early America, however, the government strove not 
only to increase citizens’ knowledge about government, but also to foster 
the ability of citizens to talk to each other. This was demonstrated, for 
example, in the growth of the postal system and subsidization of 
newspapers. 
Similarly, the Census changed from the traditional role of census taking, 
which had been—at least since Caesar Augustus—to provide government 
with information about individual subjects for tax or military purposes.31 
But in America, the Census made no individual information available to the 
                                                                                                                 
 27. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 28. Admittedly, the body of the Constitution does not have much bearing on openness, 
though it did expand congressional openness as compared to colonial and British precedents. 
See id. art. 1, § 5, cl. 3; see also id. amend. I. 
 29. Benjamin Rush, Letter to Richard Price (May 25, 1786), in 1 LETTERS OF BENJAMIN 
RUSH 388, 388 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1951). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Frank C. Bourne, The Roman Republican Census and Census Statistics, 45 
CLASSICAL WKLY. 129, 129-35 (1952). 
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government.32 Instead, aggregate statistical information was made available 
to the public and the government to be used for allocation of 
representatives.33 
In the late eighteenth century, the Senate opened its doors to the public—
and to reporters.34 In the early nineteenth century, post offices, newspapers, 
schools, and voluntary associations all proliferated. This created new 
avenues for the exchange, dissemination and understanding of information. 
“[D]iffusion of information”—which, in his first Inaugural Address, 
Jefferson called one of “the essential principles of our Government”—
became a norm that breathed life into the newborn American democracy.35 
The Senate Opens Its Doors. The Senate—in contrast to the House—
began in 1789 by continuing the colonial and British practice of meeting 
secretly.36 Indeed, the Senate went so far as to bar House members from its 
sessions.37 
Closing the Senate’s doors prompted the first serious national debate 
about secrecy.38 It was a political issue, but the issue went far beyond short-
term politics. It was an early skirmish over the nature of the American 
nation. Was America to keep British hierarchical habits where members of 
the public were merely bystanders between elections? Or would America 
chart a new course where the public was regularly informed about 
government affairs? Was America to be only a republic or also a 
democracy? 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Frequently Asked Questions: Can the U.S. Census Bureau Help Me Find 
Information About My Family’s History?, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://ask.census.gov/ 
faq.php?id=5000&faqId=427 (last visited June 10, 2013). 
 33. Congressional Apportionment: Historical Perspective, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/population/apportionment/about/history.html (last visited June 11, 
2013). 
 34. 1787-1800: December 9, 1975: The Senate Opens Its Doors, U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/The_Senate_Opens_Its_Doors.htm (last 
visited June 11, 2013). 
 35. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: 
WRITINGS 492, 494-95 (1984). 
 36. ROBERT MOON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 93-790 GOV, SECRET SESSIONS IN THE 
U.S. CONGRESS 8 (1993). 
 37. See 1787-1800: April 18, 1792: Chamber Access, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate. 
gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Chamber_access.htm (last visited June 12, 2013). 
 38. See SAMUEL E. FORMAN, THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF PHILIP FRENEAU 63 (1902), 
reprinted in 20 JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
(J. M. Vincent et al. eds., 1902). 
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The most impassioned case for openness was made by a journalist, Philip 
Freneau, a Princeton classmate of James Madison.39 In 1791, Secretary of 
State Thomas Jefferson appointed Freneau as a State Department 
translator.40 Even though Freneau was working for the government, 
Jefferson and Madison persuaded him—and paid him—to work 
simultaneously as the editor of the National Gazette, a new newspaper 
created to attack the Federalists.41 
In numerous articles, Freneau advocated ending the Senate’s secrecy 
which, he said, adopted “the secret privileges of the [British] House of 
Lords.”42 Some of Freneau’s arguments were frenetic and colorfully 
phrased: “[S]ecrecy in your representatives is a worm which will prey and 
fatten upon the vitals of your liberty.”43 “Secrecy is necessary to design and 
a masque to treachery; honesty shrinks not from the public eye.”44 At the 
core of Freneau’s stance in favor of openness, however, was an argument 
about the American people’s role in public affairs: “Are you freemen who 
ought to know the individual conduct of your legislators, or are you an 
inferior order of beings incapable of comprehending the sublimity of 
senatorial functions, and unworthy to be entrusted with their opinions?”45 
In 1794, after five years of criticism, the Senate voted to open its doors 
in its next session.46 Although Freneau had by then closed the National 
Gazette, his broadsides stoked the debate.47 The free press-fueled discussion 
resulted in an increase in government openness. In addition, some New 
England Federalist Senators switched sides to support openness because 
they concluded, “[T]he old, elitist style in politics was obsolescent.”48 
Power in the new America was based on publicity and openness, not the 
closed style of aristocratic England. 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See id. at 9-10, 63. 
 40. Id. at 29-32. 
 41. See id. at 29-36. For more information on Freneau and the opening of the Senate, 
see JAMES MELVIN LEE, HISTORY OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM 127-28 (1917). 
 42. Philip Freneau, NAT’L GAZETTE (Feb. 1792), reprinted in FORMAN, supra note 38, at 
63, 64. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See MOON, supra note 36, at 8-9. 
 47. See FORMAN, supra note 38, at 73-74. 
 48. DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A 
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS 88 (1981). 
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The Postal Service and Newspapers. At the start, the postal system was 
the biggest part of America’s new government.49 It grew rapidly. In 1788, 
there were sixty-nine post offices.50 Congress created a national postal 
system in 1792.51 By 1820, there were more than four thousand post 
offices.52 
Expansion of the postal service coincided with, and indeed helped drive, 
the proliferation of newspapers. Madison had argued that the “real 
sovereign in every free” government was “public opinion.”53 Moreover, in 
large countries such as the United States, “a free press, and particularly a 
circulation of newspapers through the entire body of the people” was 
necessary for a republican government and, indeed, for liberty.54 The next 
year, Congress subsidized newspaper distribution in the Post Office Act of 
1792.55 
Discounted delivery costs coupled with Americans’ hunger for 
information drove huge increases in both the number of newspapers and 
their circulation.56 This accelerated the spread of information. The number 
of newspapers transmitted through the postal system more than tripled in 
the 1790s.57 There were about two hundred papers by 1801, and 1250 by 
1834.58 By the early 1830s, more than 90% of the mail (by weight) 
consisted of newspapers.59 But newspapers accounted for less than 15% of 
postal revenue.60 
Thomas Jefferson viewed newspapers as vital, once proclaiming that 
“were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without 
newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM 
FRANKLIN TO MORSE 3-4 (1995). 
 50. Richard R. John, Expanding the Realm of Communications, in 2 A HISTORY OF THE 
BOOK IN AMERICA: AN EXTENSIVE REPUBLIC 211, 212 (Robert A. Gross & Mary Kelley eds., 
2010). 
 51. See id. at 212-13. 
 52. Id. at 216. 
 53. James Madison, Public Opinion, NAT’L GAZETTE (Dec. 19, 1791), reprinted in 
JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 500, 500 (1999). 
 54. Id. at 501. 
 55. JOHN, supra note 49, at 36; see also Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 22, 1 Stat. 232, 
238. 
 56. JOHN, supra note 49, at 37-38. 
 57. See id. at 4. 
 58. THE AMERICAN ALMANAC AND REPOSITORY OF USEFUL KNOWLEDGE FOR THE YEAR 
1835, at 266 (Charles Bowen ed., 1834). 
 59. JOHN, supra note 49, at 38. 
 60. Id. 
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moment to prefer the latter.”61 (Of course, Jefferson—as is no doubt true for 
all political figures—occasionally lamented and lambasted some of what 
was said about him in the papers of the day, including rumors of his liaison 
with Sally Hemmings, one of his slaves.62) 
Outside observers also noted the importance of newspapers to 
democracy. When the young French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville wrote 
his Democracy in America in the mid-1830s, he expressed wonder at the 
vitality of American democracy—despite its exclusion of blacks, American 
Indians, and women.63 In Tocqueville’s view, newspapers were particularly 
necessary in nations where the old bonds of aristocracy had been cast off.64 
In aristocracies, men were “strongly held together” by loyalty to their lords; 
but, in democracies, “men are no longer united among themselves by firm 
and lasting ties.”65 Therefore, in a democracy, you must “persuade every 
man whose help you require that his private interest obliges him voluntarily 
to unite” with others.66 Only newspapers do this “habitually and 
conveniently,” as “nothing but a newspaper can drop the same thought into 
a thousand minds at the same moment.”67 And in America, there was 
“scarcely a hamlet” without a newspaper.68 
The Rise of Political Parties. Madison’s concept of what we now call 
separation of powers—or checks and balances—was that all the “parts” or 
“departments” of the government—the Congress, the Executive and the 
Courts—would “be the means of keeping each other in their proper 
places.”69 Furthermore, “the great security against a gradual concentration 
of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), in THOMAS 
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 35, at 879, 880. 
 62. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Marc-Auguste Pictet (Feb. 5, 1803), in 10 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 355, 357 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., Library ed. 1903); 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas McKean (Feb. 19, 1803), in 9 THE WORKS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 449, 451-52 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., Federal ed. 1905); see also 
JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 215-20 (1998). 
 63. See 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Phillips Bradley ed., 
Henry Reeve & Francis Bowen trans., McClelland & Stewart Ltd. 7th prtg. 1957) (1840). 
 64. Id. at 111-14. 
 65. Id. at 107, 111. 
 66. Id. at 111. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 186 (Phillips Bradley ed., 
Henry Reeve & Francis Bowen trans., McClelland & Stewart Ltd. 9th prtg. 1963) (1840). 
 69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 17, at 320 (James Madison). 
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who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and 
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”70 
Put more pithily, “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”71 
However, with the development of political parties in early America, 
loyalty to a public official’s own “department” was diluted by party 
relationships between members of Congress and Presidents. Separation of 
powers—which Madison had referred to as only an “auxiliary 
precaution[]”—became even less of a bulwark against “encroachments.”72 
The People’s vote remained “the primary control on the government.”73 
Indeed, as Jefferson commented, “Perhaps this party division is necessary 
to induce each to watch & delate to the people the proceedings of the 
other.”74 
Thus, the rise of political parties made public access to information even 
more necessary to support our constitutional system and our democracy. 
* * * * 
For a century and a half after the victory for openness led by Jefferson 
and his followers, there were periodic clashes about particular acts of 
governmental secrecy. But the culture of openness remained largely 
unchanged until the mid-twentieth century. At that point, there was an 
enormous increase in presidential power—leading to what Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. called the “Imperial Presidency.”75 More presidential power 
was coupled with the growth of huge bureaucracies, including a mighty 
military and intelligence establishment.76 Most importantly, there was also 
an accompanying atmosphere of permanent fear stemming from Pearl 
Harbor, the atomic bomb, the Cold War, and the 9/11 terror attacks. 
All of these changes and challenges led to the Secrecy Era, during which 
a culture of secrecy came to dominate America. During this period, the 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Id. at 321-22. 
 71. Id. at 322. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (June 4, 1798), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: 
WRITINGS, supra note 35, at 1048, 1049. “Delate” derives from the Latin “dēlāt-”: “to bear 
or bring away or down, convey, deliver, report, indict, accuse, etc.” 4 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 408 (J. A. Simpson & E. S. C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989). It was used before 
Jefferson by, among others, Samuel Johnson. See id. Jefferson concluded his letter to Taylor 
with a “caution” to “let nothing of mine get before the public” for if “the Porcupines” got 
hold of a “single sentence” they would “abuse & persecute me in their papers for months.” 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, supra, at 1051. 
 75. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). 
 76. Id. at 164-68. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss4/3
2013]        ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 657 
 
 
government switched its position. It increasingly strove to limit the 
availability of information about itself—and, at the same time, to take more 
information from the people. 
Today, we are left with a sharp debate about the harms and the benefits 
of secrecy and openness. And so now I am going to shift gears and discuss 
how the Courts have—and have not—contributed to that debate. 
II. Blinded by Deference: The Courts and Secrecy 
Of course, the debate between openness and secrecy has two sides. There 
are legitimate secrets that need protection. Arguments by the executive 
branch for secrecy, based upon “national security,” are entitled to weight. 
But, in almost all cases, the courts have given conclusive weight to 
claims of “national security.” This is true in cases where the government 
moves to dismiss cases because it claims the litigation will expose a “state 
secret.”77 It is also true in Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cases where 
the government resists production of documents on “national security” 
grounds.78 
But it is not just the uniformity of the ultimate result that is revealing. It 
is also what the courts do not do in the course of deciding these cases. 
Courts do not look behind government officials’ assertions of national 
security harm. While a court’s job is to decide individual cases, it is striking 
to see the narrow lens the courts use to examine secrecy cases. Courts pay 
no attention to the fundamental importance of openness to American 
democracy.79 And they pay no attention to the long-lasting and 
overwhelming evidence that secrecy has been overused—and misused.80 
This has even included false representations to the courts themselves.81 
Moreover, the courts do not consider ways to protect asserted national 
security interests and still allow disclosure of important information. They 
do not consider redacting portions of documents in FOIA cases.82 And, in 
“state secrets” cases brought against the government or its agents, the courts 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1076, 1083-84 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (en banc); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535, 537-38 (E.D. Va. 2006), 
aff’d sub nom, El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 78. See, e.g., Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 863-65 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Maynard 
v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 553-56 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 79. See cases cited supra notes 77-78. 
 80. See cases cited supra notes 77-78. 
 81. See infra Part II.B. 
 82. See Azmy v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 562 F. Supp. 2d 590, 599-600 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see 
also cases cited supra note 78. 
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do not allow cases to continue by providing for careful treatment of 
particular “secret” evidence.83 Instead, more and more, courts dismiss the 
entire case. 
This is not the place to overwhelm with citations or close analysis of 
cases. Rather, I want to make some more general points. 
A. Failure to Recognize How Openness Is a Pillar of American Democracy. 
The history described earlier does not provide conclusive answers for a 
court contending with the struggle between openness and secrecy. But it is 
relevant. Surely, a fundamental principle of openness should, for example, 
be used to construe FOIA to provide for rigorous de novo review of secrecy 
claims. In fact, this is what Congress said should be done.84 But, in the teeth 
of Congress’s guidance, it is not what the courts have done. 
Where the executive branch turns ever more toward secrecy and away 
from sharing information with the people, we should be able to count on the 
courts to weigh in the balance the core values of American democracy. 
Their failure to do so is even more unfortunate and surprising because of 
the courts’ failure to recognize the extensive history of overuse (and 
misuse) of secrecy. 
B. Failure to Learn From or Refer to Experience 
There is overwhelming evidence about secrecy’s overuse. While there 
are genuine secrets that must be defended, it is clear that far too much 
government information is kept secret. 
For decades, bipartisan blue ribbon commissions and experts from both 
political parties have concluded that much more is classified than should be 
classified and then this information is kept classified for much too long. 
Estimates of overclassification made by top ranking military and 
intelligence professionals range from 50% to 90%.85 Yet courts do not refer 
to this huge body of evidence when they supinely accept executive branch 
secrecy claims. 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See cases cited supra note 78. 
 84. See Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 379 (1976) (“Congress vested the 
courts with the responsibility ultimately to determine ‘de novo’ any dispute as to whether the 
exemption [from release of information] was properly invoked in order to constrain agencies 
from withholding nonexempt matters.”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012). 
 85. Emerging Threats: Overclassification and Pseudo-Classification: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., Emerging Threats, & Int’l Relations of the H. Comm. on Gov’t 
Reform, 109th Cong. 120-21 (2005) (statement of Thomas S. Blanton, Nat’l Sec. Archive, 
George Washington Univ.). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss4/3
2013]        ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 659 
 
 
There is also ample evidence of classification being used to hide 
embarrassment and illegality. This was shown immediately after President 
Truman’s Executive Order in 1951 that created an expanded classification 
system.86 President Truman claimed that by segregating security from non-
security information, his order would provide Americans with “more, rather 
than less, information about the Government.”87 This dubious assertion was 
not bolstered when, just two days later, President Truman had to rescind an 
order of the Office of Price Stabilization that employees were not to 
disclose information that “‘might prove embarrassing to the O.P.S.’”88 
The overuse of secrecy to hide embarrassing and illegal conduct has been 
shown repeatedly and comprehensively ever since. 
Again, courts have ignored this body of evidence when they have 
decided FOIA and state secrets cases. Similarly, courts have not learned 
any lessons from the sad story that courts themselves have been repeatedly 
misled by claims of national security risks that later turned out to be false. 
A few examples: 
Korematsu. In Korematsu, during World War II, a divided Supreme 
Court upheld military orders of General John DeWitt that had forced some 
117,000 Japanese Americans on the West Coast to leave their homes for 
“relocation centers.”89 The Court relied on General DeWitt’s report of 
dangers posed by Japanese Americans.90 
But decades later, facts were uncovered that showed the government had 
knowingly concealed from the Court vital facts that undermined General 
DeWitt’s report.91 The Federal Communications Commission and the FBI 
had both “directly contradicted” General DeWitt’s report that Japanese 
Americans were communicating by radio with Japanese navy vessels.92 
Indeed, Department of Justice lawyers had drafted a footnote to their 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Exec. Order No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R. 471 (1952). 
 87. Memorandum on the Executive Order Prescribing Regulations for Classifying and 
Protecting Security Information, PUB. PAPERS 536 (Sept. 25, 1951). 
 88. O.P.S. Bans ‘Embarrassing’ News; Truman Quickly Rescinds Order, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 28, 1951, at 1. 
 89. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215, 223-24 (1944). The order was 
issued based on broad discretion given to the military by President Franklin Roosevelt. See 
Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1943). 
 90. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218; see also id. at 224-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 91. Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited—Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary 
Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better Accommodation of National 
Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1986). 
 92. Id. at 12. 
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Supreme Court brief referring to these “conflicts.”93 But this information 
was deleted by their Department of Justice superiors.94 It was also later 
discovered that the original version of General DeWitt’s report did not rely 
on any “military exigency,” but instead on racial “traits peculiar to citizens 
of Japanese ancestry.”95 
Based on these discoveries, convictions for violating General DeWitt’s 
order were reversed.96 Then, in 2011, the acting Solicitor General took the 
unprecedented step of confessing his office’s error in defending the 
internments.97 
Reynolds. In 1953, in another seminal case, United States v. Reynolds, 
the Supreme Court created the modern “state secrets” doctrine.98 An Air 
Force plane had crashed.99 Three widows of civilian observers on the plane 
sued.100 They sought to see the accident report.101 The Air Force asserted 
privilege, claiming the report would risk national security.102 The lower 
courts held that a judge should determine the validity of the claim by 
reviewing the report in camera.103 A divided Supreme Court reversed, 
saying the report was privileged simply because the military claimed it 
contained sensitive material.104 Moreover, the Supreme Court determined 
that no judge should look at the report to check the claim.105 
Although no one outside the military knew this at the time, it was learned 
later that before the case reached the Court, the accident report was no 
longer classified as “secret.”106 Its classification level had been reduced to 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Id. at 17-18. 
 94. Id. at 18. For a recital of these facts, see Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 
1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (granting Korematsu’s petition for a writ of coram nobis). 
 95. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 598 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 96. Id. at 608; Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420. 
 97. Neal Katyal, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the 
Japanese-American Internment Cases, JUST. BLOG (May 20, 2011), http://blogs.justice.gov/ 
main/archives/1346. 
 98. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1953). 
 99. Id. at 2-3. 
 100. Id. at 3. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 3-6. 
 103. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 990-91, 997-98 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 
U.S. 1. 
 104. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6-12. 
 105. Id. at 10.  
 106. See BARRY SIEGEL, CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE: A MYSTERIOUS PLANE CRASH, A 
LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASE, AND THE RISE OF STATE SECRETS 133 (2008). 
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“restricted.”107 Moreover, when the report was eventually publicly released, 
there was no apparent connection to any military secret.108 Instead, if the 
Third Circuit appellate judges in the case had been allowed to review the 
report, they would have seen it contained evidence of the government’s 
negligence in the plane crash.109 
Pentagon Papers. Finally, in the Pentagon Papers case, a divided 
Supreme Court rejected the executive branch’s effort to restrain the New 
York Times and the Washington Post from publishing portions of the 
history of America’s involvement in Vietnam and its escalation of that 
war.110 The issue for the Court was the constitutionality of a “prior 
restraint.”111 There was no meaningful analysis of the strengths or 
weaknesses of the government’s case for secrecy. 
In the lower courts, however, it was clear that the government had, once 
again, exaggerated the need for secrecy.112 Indeed, in seeking to prove that 
national security was at risk, the government looked like a gang that 
couldn’t shoot straight.113 It had to start by conceding that two “top secret” 
volumes contained documents that had been in the public domain when the 
papers were compiled.114 Moreover—proving the ship of state is the only 
ship that primarily leaks from the top—President Johnson’s draft memoir 
had quoted extensively from the “top secret” documents in the Papers.115 
Finally, when pressed during a secret court hearing to describe any 
document in the Papers that was particularly harmful to national security, 
the government referenced a radio intercept.116 But the Post’s Pentagon 
reporter “stunned everyone by pulling out . . . a verbatim record of the 
intercept, in an unclassified transcript of” a Senate committee hearing.117 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. at 297-98. 
 109. Id. at 210-11, 298. 
 110. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en 
banc) (per curiam), aff’d sub nom. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. 713; United States v. N.Y. 
Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev’d, 444 F.2d 544 (2d. Cir. 1971) (en 
banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 403 U.S. 713. 
 113. See BEN BRADLEE, A GOOD LIFE: NEWSPAPERING AND OTHER ADVENTURES 319-20 
(1995) (detailing the government’s courtroom activities aimed at protecting secrecy). 
 114. See DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF THE 
PENTAGON PAPERS CASE 148 (1996). 
 115. See Leslie H. Gelb, The Pentagon Papers and the Vantage Point, 6 FOREIGN POL’Y 
25, 31-32 (1972). 
 116. BRADLEE, supra note 113, at 320. 
 117. Id. 
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About twenty years after the Supreme Court allowed the newspapers to 
continue publication, former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, who had 
argued the case for the government in the Supreme Court, admitted, “I have 
never seen any trace of a threat to the national security from the 
publication.”118 Griswold added: “It quickly becomes apparent to any 
person who has considerable experience with classified material that there 
is massive overclassification and that the principal concern of the classifiers 
is not with national security, but rather with governmental embarrassment 
of one sort or another.”119 
United States v. Nixon. Nixon presents a different sort of problem. Rather 
than being misled or ignoring history, the Court itself simply assumed a 
theory to justify extensive future use of “executive privilege” claims by 
Presidents.120 Of course, Nixon is famous because the Supreme Court 
forced President Nixon to turn over to the Watergate Special Prosecutor 
copies of secret White House tapes recording the President’s meetings in 
the Oval Office.121 Material on the tape—particularly President Nixon’s 
effort to use fictitious claims of national security to get the CIA to stop the 
FBI’s investigation of Watergate—were the last straw in President Nixon’s 
struggle to keep his job.122 
A more lasting impact of the Nixon decision, however, is the Court’s 
statement that requiring President Nixon to turn over the tapes was an 
exception.123 Generally, said the Court, conversations in the Oval Office 
should be presumptively and perpetually protected by “executive 
privilege.”124 This was pure dicta, unnecessary to the decision, and reached 
without any argument on the other side. The Court just assumed there 
should be a privilege. “Central to the Court’s pro-secrecy reasoning was a 
highly contestable view of human nature, one for which neither the Court 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping: The Courts and Classified 
Information, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25. 
 119. Id. At the oral argument of the Pentagon Papers case in the Supreme Court, 
Griswold expressed some doubts about the breadth of the government’s claims of the need 
for secrecy, but without using the categorical and colorful language of his retrospective view 
eighteen years later. See Transcript of Oral Argument, N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 
U.S. 713 (1971) (Nos. 1873, 1885) in 71 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 213, 218-19 (Philip B. 
Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). 
 120. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-07 (1974). 
 121. See id. at 686-88, 712-14. 
 122. See Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Resigns, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1974, at A1. 
 123. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712-13. 
 124. See id. at 708. 
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nor the president offered any evidence.”125 Unless there is a presumptive, 
perpetual privilege, said the Court, advisors in White House meetings “may 
well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own 
interests.”126 
As I have written elsewhere, the Nixon Court’s assumption is dubious.127 
Moreover, the Nixon Court paid no attention whatsoever to the harmful 
impact an assumption of perpetual secrecy can have on the nature of White 
House meetings.128 
So what explains the courts being so lax? Fear. Fear that the courts might 
turn out to be wrong. Fear that the courts may lack the competence to 
evaluate secrecy claims. In addition, there may be some institutional 
reasons relating to courts and judges themselves that help explain why 
judges tend to tilt towards secrecy. 
Openness is a key to our democracy. It is unfortunate that the courts do 
not seem to appreciate this. Sometimes Congress also does not. But at 
times, it does. 
* * * * 
So let me conclude with some congressional rhetoric of which I am 
rather proud. The Church Committee proclaimed its belief that America 
would benefit from hearing the truth and confronting past mistakes: 
 Despite our distaste for what we have seen, we have great 
faith in this country. The story is sad, but this country has the 
strength to hear the story and to learn from it. We must remain a 
people who confront our mistakes and resolve not to repeat 
them. If we do not, we will decline; but, if we do, our future will 
be worthy of the best of our past.129 
The Committee concluded with words that ring true decades later: 
 The United States must not adopt the tactics of the enemy. 
Means are as important as ends. Crisis makes it tempting to 
ignore the wise restraints that make men free. But each time we 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Eric Lane, Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. & Emily Berman, Too Big a Canon in the 
President’s Arsenal: Another Look at United States v. Nixon, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 737, 
744 (2010). 
 126. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705. 
 127. See Lane, Schwarz & Berman, supra note 125, at 752-76. 
 128. See id. at 760-76. 
 129. SELECT COMM., INTERIM REPORT, supra note 13, at 285. 
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do so, each time the means we use are wrong, our inner strength, 
the strength which makes us free, is lessened.130 
 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. Although this Assassinations Report was the first issued by the Church 
Committee, its sentiments were echoed throughout the Committee’s work. See sources cited 
supra note 13. While the author’s drafts of the rest of this Assassinations Report had been 
reviewed by the Senators on the Select Committee, this epilogue was written just as the 
report was being sent to the printer. Senator Church approved it so long as Vice Chair John 
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